Matthew Festenstein: Scepticism in the politics of culture
One of the most persistent spectres haunting work in the political theory of cultural diversity, nationalism and ethnic pluralism has been a worry about naivety. Arguments that culture should be treated as possessing normative significance are confronted with the objection that this claim rests on a disingenuous conception of social identity, one which masks what ‘the hidden politics of identification’. This paper addresses a global scepticism about the claim for the normative significance of cultural identity, which is fuelled by the thought that this claim rests on what Seyla Benhabib has called a ‘faulty epistemology’ or ‘reductionist sociology’. This is distinguished from a local doubt about some or other particular claim about a cultural identity. I consider four versions of the global claim, resting respectively on the empirical fact of disagreement, the constructed character of social identities, the conditions for identification with an identity, and an argument about the pragmatic disingenuousness of claims for culture. I argue that there are significant objections to each of these. In conclusion, I argue that the grounds for justified doubt about cultural claims tend to be local, and lie not in the epistemological unintelligibility of these claims, but in their injustice or dangerousness – they are political, not epistemological.
Daniel Tseghay: The Pragmatist Approach to Multiculturalism
Abstract:
This paper argues for a pragmatist approach to the multicultural issue. The legal pragmatist, as exemplified by Richard Posner in my paper, views the relationship between the state, or law-makers, and the citizens of the state, including disparate ethnic groups, as engaged in a dialogic relationship, rather than one that is essentially monologic. Such a view entails that legal questions have no determinate answers before they are discussed, in a conversational and democratic manner, with the cultural groups affected. Although this may not ensure equity, or a resolution to the problems associated with multiculturalism, it is the only option worth considering. The authors discussed in this paper include Richard Rorty, James Tully, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Sabine Ammon (Technische Universität Berlin): Pluralism and Hegemony: A Philosophical Approach towards Post-Pluralism
Abtract:
For current pluralistic theories, it is a contradiction to talk at the same time of pluralism and hegemony. Pluralistic approaches stress the multitude of cultures, conceptual schemes, moral systems or knowledge systems. They intend to characterize the peculiarities of each culture or system. Usually, they show impressively the differences by comparing various schemes. By this, they intend to demonstrate that there is no way of unifying the different systems to an all-embracing one. The systems are regarded to be independent from each other. This line of argument goes hand in hand with a – sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit – normative request: the diverse cultures or systems have to be treated as equal. There is no epistemic or moral superiority a priori of one of the systems.
From this perspective, discussing the hegemonic aspects of various moral systems or epistemic ones, seems to be self-contradictory. When we look at dominance and marginalisation, at the hegemonic relationship of cultures, their ways of interacting, their mutual influence, their interrelation, their processes of exchange: all these aspects cannot be reflected adequately in traditional pluralistic theories. To investigate these aspects is necessary today: our societies become more and more dynamic, exchange on a global level becomes a common phenomenon and multiculturalism becomes a fact even in so-called culturally homogenous states.
Therefore, I want to ask in my paper why we cannot explore these questions within a traditional pluralistic framework. Traditional pluralism is unable to deal at the same time on the one hand with a diversity of different types of systems and to characterise on the other hand the power structures embedded in this relationship. However, it can be shown that the problem can be found in the theoretical grounding of pluralism. Conceptual pluralism is based on an idealisation of the notion of the conceptual scheme. As a consequence, contradiction and incommensurability govern the relation between different types of schemes or systems. There is no way to explore their interrelations.
Based on this analysis, the paper tries to find a solution how pluralistic theories can be developed further towards a post-pluralism which enables to consider also hegemonic aspects. Therefore, I will ask to what extent theories of pluralism have to be adapted and improved in order to enable the investigation of interacting systems or cultures. The problems of pluralism and its inadequacy are a result of an idealisation and a reductionism. Hence, the abstract conceptual schemes have to be considered in the original life world. If concrete practices are investigated, we get access to the hegemonic structures and therefore the theoretical basis to explore the consequences of multiculturalism. This essential reconception of epistemic pluralism has an interesting side-effect: this novel, post-pluralistic approach enables to bridge the gap between philosophical epistemology and social sciences.
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
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